[PATCH] crypto: x86/chacha - Remove SIMD fallback path

[Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>]

On Wed, Apr 02, 2025 at 08:59:34PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
>
> But in a lot of cases there is also no reason to even add that restriction.  I'm
> not sure why you're so eager to make the library functions harder to use.

I have no intention of making any changes to siphash.  It doesn't
even use SIMD.

All I want to do is get rid of the crypto_simd_usable() fallback
paths that we currently have in arch/x86/crypto.  This code is
never used in hardirq context (and should never be).

For example:

---8<---
Get rid of the fallback path as SIMD is now always usable in softirq
context.

Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
index 8bb74a272879..6a3d60cf3192 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/chacha_glue.c
@@ -6,9 +6,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2015 Martin Willi
  */
 
-#include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/chacha.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/module.h>
@@ -35,7 +33,6 @@ asmlinkage void chacha_4block_xor_avx512vl(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
 asmlinkage void chacha_8block_xor_avx512vl(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
 					   unsigned int len, int nrounds);
 
-static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(chacha_use_simd);
 static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(chacha_use_avx2);
 static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(chacha_use_avx512vl);
 
@@ -123,23 +120,15 @@ static void chacha_dosimd(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src,
 
 void hchacha_block_arch(const u32 *state, u32 *stream, int nrounds)
 {
-	if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable()) {
-		hchacha_block_generic(state, stream, nrounds);
-	} else {
-		kernel_fpu_begin();
-		hchacha_block_ssse3(state, stream, nrounds);
-		kernel_fpu_end();
-	}
+	kernel_fpu_begin();
+	hchacha_block_ssse3(state, stream, nrounds);
+	kernel_fpu_end();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(hchacha_block_arch);
 
 void chacha_crypt_arch(u32 *state, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, unsigned int bytes,
 		       int nrounds)
 {
-	if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) || !crypto_simd_usable() ||
-	    bytes <= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE)
-		return chacha_crypt_generic(state, dst, src, bytes, nrounds);
-
 	do {
 		unsigned int todo = min_t(unsigned int, bytes, SZ_4K);
 
@@ -171,18 +160,11 @@ static int chacha_simd_stream_xor(struct skcipher_request *req,
 		if (nbytes < walk.total)
 			nbytes = round_down(nbytes, walk.stride);
 
-		if (!static_branch_likely(&chacha_use_simd) ||
-		    !crypto_simd_usable()) {
-			chacha_crypt_generic(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
-					     walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
-					     ctx->nrounds);
-		} else {
-			kernel_fpu_begin();
-			chacha_dosimd(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
-				      walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
-				      ctx->nrounds);
-			kernel_fpu_end();
-		}
+		kernel_fpu_begin();
+		chacha_dosimd(state, walk.dst.virt.addr,
+			      walk.src.virt.addr, nbytes,
+			      ctx->nrounds);
+		kernel_fpu_end();
 		err = skcipher_walk_done(&walk, walk.nbytes - nbytes);
 	}
 
@@ -207,13 +189,9 @@ static int xchacha_simd(struct skcipher_request *req)
 
 	chacha_init(state, ctx->key, req->iv);
 
-	if (req->cryptlen > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE && crypto_simd_usable()) {
-		kernel_fpu_begin();
-		hchacha_block_ssse3(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
-		kernel_fpu_end();
-	} else {
-		hchacha_block_generic(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
-	}
+	kernel_fpu_begin();
+	hchacha_block_ssse3(state, subctx.key, ctx->nrounds);
+	kernel_fpu_end();
 	subctx.nrounds = ctx->nrounds;
 
 	memcpy(&real_iv[0], req->iv + 24, 8);
@@ -275,8 +253,6 @@ static int __init chacha_simd_mod_init(void)
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
 		return 0;
 
-	static_branch_enable(&chacha_use_simd);
-
 	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
 	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX2) &&
 	    cpu_has_xfeatures(XFEATURE_MASK_SSE | XFEATURE_MASK_YMM, NULL)) {
-- 
Email: Herbert Xu <herbert@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt