On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 3:53 PM Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Thu, Jul 31, 2025 at 10:40:40AM +0800, Pavel Tikhomirov wrote:
> > If detached mounts are our only concern, it looks like the check instead of:
> >
> > if (!check_mnt(mnt)) {
> > err = -EINVAL;
> > goto out_unlock;
> > }
> >
> > could've been a more relaxed one:
> >
> > if (mnt_detached(mnt)) {
> > err = -EINVAL;
> > goto out_unlock;
> > }
> >
> > bool mnt_detached(struct mount *mnt)
> > {
> > return !mnt->mnt_ns;
> > }
> >
> > not to allow propagation change only on detached mounts. (As
> > umount_tree sets mnt_ns to NULL.)
>
> Changing propagation settings on detached mounts is fine and shoud work?
> Changing propagation settings on unmounted mounts not so much...
Sorry, it's my confused terminology, here by "detached" mounts I mean
mounts which were unmounted with umount2(MNT_DETACH), maybe I should
call them "unmounted" (e.g. s/mnt_detached/mnt_unmounted/).
And yes, I understand why we need to allow changing propagation on
mounts in anonymous namespace without being inside it, because one
can't just enter anonymous namespace.
I don't think that we need to change anything, just sharing my
thoughts that it could be more relaxed and will still protect us from
propagation setting on unmounted mounts.
>
> >
> > Also in do_mount_setattr we have a more relaxed check too:
> >
> > if ((mnt_has_parent(mnt) || !is_anon_ns(mnt->mnt_ns)) && !check_mnt(mnt))
> > goto out;
> >
> > Best Regards, Tikhomirov Pavel.
> >
> > On Sun, Jul 27, 2025 at 5:01 AM Andrei Vagin <avagin@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Sat, Jul 26, 2025 at 10:53 AM Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > > On Sat, Jul 26, 2025 at 10:12:34AM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Jul 24, 2025 at 4:00 PM Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Thu, Jul 24, 2025 at 01:02:48PM -0700, Andrei Vagin wrote:
> > > > > > > Hi Al and Christian,
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > The commit 12f147ddd6de ("do_change_type(): refuse to operate on
> > > > > > > unmounted/not ours mounts") introduced an ABI backward compatibility
> > > > > > > break. CRIU depends on the previous behavior, and users are now
> > > > > > > reporting criu restore failures following the kernel update. This change
> > > > > > > has been propagated to stable kernels. Is this check strictly required?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Yes.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > > Would it be possible to check only if the current process has
> > > > > > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN within the mount user namespace?
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Not enough, both in terms of permissions *and* in terms of "thou
> > > > > > shalt not bugger the kernel data structures - nobody's priveleged
> > > > > > enough for that".
> > > > >
> > > > > Al,
> > > > >
> > > > > I am still thinking in terms of "Thou shalt not break userspace"...
> > > > >
> > > > > Seriously though, this original behavior has been in the kernel for 20
> > > > > years, and it hasn't triggered any corruptions in all that time.
> > > >
> > > > For a very mild example of fun to be had there:
> > > > mount("none", "/mnt", "tmpfs", 0, "");
> > > > chdir("/mnt");
> > > > umount2(".", MNT_DETACH);
> > > > mount(NULL, ".", NULL, MS_SHARED, NULL);
> > > > Repeat in a loop, watch mount group id leak. That's a trivial example
> > > > of violating the assertion ("a mount that had been through umount_tree()
> > > > is out of propagation graph and related data structures for good").
> > >
> > > I wasn't referring to detached mounts. CRIU modifies mounts from
> > > non-current namespaces.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > As for the "CAP_SYS_ADMIN within the mount user namespace" - which
> > > > userns do you have in mind?
> > > >
> > >
> > > The user namespace of the target mount:
> > > ns_capable(mnt->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
> > >
