Re: [EXT] Re: Plans for post-quantum-secure signature algorithms for host and public key authentication?

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On Fri, 11 Jul 2025 22:31:18 +0000
"Blumenthal, Uri - 0553 - MITLL" <uri@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> While SLH-DSA may be more secure than ML-DSA, performance and
> signature size would make it prohibitive for dynamic authentication
> for many use cases. 
> 
> As to how much security you need – for the vast majority of users
> ML-DSA is plenty secure “enough”. To the point that US and German
> governments (probably, among others – I didn’t bother to check)
> decided to bet their security on it. 

There is a pretty significant community of users and developers
(oftentimes people involved with projects like Kicksecure, Whonix, and
Qubes OS, all of which I either contribute to or am paid to work on)
where "secure enough for the government" is not secure enough. Many of
those people work in situations where paranoid-level security mesures
are warranted, and for those people I feel having SLH-DSA would be
reasonable. Performance isn't a high priority in a lot of these
situations.

--
Aaron

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