On Tue, Jul 8, 2025 at 11:55 AM Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > > On Tue, Jul 08, 2025, Rick P Edgecombe wrote: > > On Tue, 2025-07-08 at 11:03 -0700, Sean Christopherson wrote: > > > > I think there is interest in de-coupling it? > > > > > > No? > > > > I'm talking about the intra-host migration/reboot optimization stuff. And not > > doing a good job, sorry. > > > > > Even if we get to a point where multiple distinct VMs can bind to a single > > > guest_memfd, e.g. for inter-VM shared memory, there will still need to be a > > > sole > > > owner of the memory. AFAICT, fully decoupling guest_memfd from a VM would add > > > non-trivial complexity for zero practical benefit. > > > > I'm talking about moving a gmem fd between different VMs or something using > > KVM_LINK_GUEST_MEMFD [0]. Not advocating to try to support it. But trying to > > feel out where the concepts are headed. It kind of allows gmem fds (or just > > their source memory?) to live beyond a VM lifecycle. > > I think the answer is that we want to let guest_memfd live beyond the "struct kvm" > instance, but not beyond the Virtual Machine. From a past discussion on this topic[*]. > > : No go. Because again, the inode (physical memory) is coupled to the virtual machine > : as a thing, not to a "struct kvm". Or more concretely, the inode is coupled to an > : ASID or an HKID, and there can be multiple "struct kvm" objects associated with a > : single ASID. And at some point in the future, I suspect we'll have multiple KVM > : objects per HKID too. > : > : The current SEV use case is for the migration helper, where two KVM objects share > : a single ASID (the "real" VM and the helper). I suspect TDX will end up with > : similar behavior where helper "VMs" can use the HKID of the "real" VM. For KVM, > : that means multiple struct kvm objects being associated with a single HKID. > : > : To prevent use-after-free, KVM "just" needs to ensure the helper instances can't > : outlive the real instance, i.e. can't use the HKID/ASID after the owning virtual > : machine has been destroyed. > : > : To put it differently, "struct kvm" is a KVM software construct that _usually_, > : but not always, is associated 1:1 with a virtual machine. > : > : And FWIW, stashing the pointer without holding a reference would not be a complete > : solution, because it couldn't guard against KVM reusing a pointer. E.g. if a > : struct kvm was unbound and then freed, KVM could reuse the same memory for a new > : struct kvm, with a different ASID/HKID, and get a false negative on the rebinding > : check. > > Exactly what that will look like in code is TBD, but the concept/logic holds up. I think we can simplify the role of guest_memfd in line with discussion [1]: 1) guest_memfd is a memory provider for userspace, KVM, IOMMU. - It allows fallocate to populate/deallocate memory 2) guest_memfd supports the notion of private/shared faults. 3) guest_memfd supports memory access control: - It allows shared faults from userspace, KVM, IOMMU - It allows private faults from KVM, IOMMU 4) guest_memfd supports changing access control on its ranges between shared/private. - It notifies the users to invalidate their mappings for the ranges getting converted/truncated. Responsibilities that ideally should not be taken up by guest_memfd: 1) guest_memfd can not initiate pre-faulting on behalf of it's users. 2) guest_memfd should not be directly communicating with the underlying architecture layers. - All communication should go via KVM/IOMMU. 3) KVM should ideally associate the lifetime of backing pagetables/protection tables/RMP tables with the lifetime of the binding of memslots with guest_memfd. - Today KVM SNP logic ties RMP table entry lifetimes with how long the folios are mapped in guest_memfd, which I think should be revisited. Some very early thoughts on how guest_memfd could be laid out for the long term: 1) guest_memfd code ideally should be built-in to the kernel. 2) guest_memfd instances should still be created using KVM IOCTLs that carry specific capabilities/restrictions for its users based on the backing VM/arch. 3) Any outgoing communication from guest_memfd to it's users like userspace/KVM/IOMMU should be via notifiers to invalidate similar to how MMU notifiers work. 4) KVM and IOMMU can implement intermediate layers to handle interaction with guest_memfd. - e.g. there could be a layer within kvm that handles: - creating guest_memfd files and associating a kvm_gmem_context with those files. - memslot binding - kvm_gmem_context will be used to bind kvm memslots with the context ranges. - invalidate notifier handling - kvm_gmem_context will be used to intercept guest_memfd callbacks and translate them to the right GPA ranges. - linking - kvm_gmem_context can be linked to different KVM instances. This line of thinking can allow cleaner separation between guest_memfd/KVM/IOMMU [2]. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAGtprH-+gPN8J_RaEit=M_ErHWTmFHeCipC6viT6PHhG3ELg6A@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx/#t [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/31beeed3-b1be-439b-8a5b-db8c06dadc30@xxxxxxx/ > > [*] https://lore.kernel.org/all/ZOO782YGRY0YMuPu@xxxxxxxxxx > > > [0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1747368092.git.afranji@xxxxxxxxxx/ > > https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/cover.1749672978.git.afranji@xxxxxxxxxx/