The routine only encounters errors when people try to access things they
can't, which is a negligible amount of calls.
The only questionable bit might be the pre-existing predict around
MAY_WRITE. Currently the routine is predominantly used for MAY_EXEC, so
this makes some sense.
I verified this straightens out the asm.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@xxxxxxxxx>
---
fs/namei.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index daebc307c1a3..cff69c12d6fd 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -571,14 +571,14 @@ int inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
int retval;
retval = sb_permission(inode->i_sb, inode, mask);
- if (retval)
+ if (unlikely(retval))
return retval;
if (unlikely(mask & MAY_WRITE)) {
/*
* Nobody gets write access to an immutable file.
*/
- if (IS_IMMUTABLE(inode))
+ if (unlikely(IS_IMMUTABLE(inode)))
return -EPERM;
/*
@@ -586,16 +586,16 @@ int inode_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
* written back improperly if their true value is unknown
* to the vfs.
*/
- if (HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(idmap, inode))
+ if (unlikely(HAS_UNMAPPED_ID(idmap, inode)))
return -EACCES;
}
retval = do_inode_permission(idmap, inode, mask);
- if (retval)
+ if (unlikely(retval))
return retval;
retval = devcgroup_inode_permission(inode, mask);
- if (retval)
+ if (unlikely(retval))
return retval;
return security_inode_permission(inode, mask);
--
2.48.1
