On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 3:34 AM Miklos Szeredi <miklos@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 13 Jun 2022 at 11:37, Christian Brauner <brauner@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >
> > On Mon, Jun 13, 2022 at 10:23:47AM +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > > On Fri, 10 Jun 2022 at 23:39, Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@xxxxxx> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > On 6/7/22 1:47 AM, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > > > > On Wed, Jun 01, 2022 at 11:44:07AM -0700, Dave Marchevsky wrote:
> > >
> > > [...]
> > >
> > > > >> +static bool __read_mostly allow_other_parent_userns;
> > > > >> +module_param(allow_other_parent_userns, bool, 0644);
> > > > >> +MODULE_PARM_DESC(allow_other_parent_userns,
> > > > >> + "Allow users not in mounting or descendant userns "
> > > > >> + "to access FUSE with allow_other set");
> > > > >
> > > > > The name of the parameter also suggests that access is granted to parent
> > > > > userns tasks whereas the change seems to me to allows every task access
> > > > > to that fuse filesystem independent of what userns they are in.
> > > > >
> > > > > So even a task in a sibling userns could - probably with rather
> > > > > elaborate mount propagation trickery - access that fuse filesystem.
> > > > >
> > > > > AFaict, either the module parameter is misnamed or the patch doesn't
> > > > > implement the behavior expressed in the name.
> > > > >
> > > > > The original patch restricted access to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable task.
> > > > > Did we agree that it was a good idea to weaken it to all tasks?
> > > > > Shouldn't we still just restrict this to CAP_SYS_ADMIN capable tasks in
> > > > > the initial userns?
> > > >
> > > > I think it's fine to allow for CAP_SYS_ADMIN only, but can we then
> > > > ignore the allow_other mount option in such case? The idea is that
> > > > CAP_SYS_ADMIN allows you to read FUSE-backed contents no matter what, so
> > > > user not mounting with allow_other preventing root from reading contents
> > > > defeats the purpose at least partially.
> > >
> > > If we want to be compatible with "user_allow_other", then it should be
> > > checking if the uid/gid of the current task is mapped in the
> > > filesystems user_ns (fsuidgid_has_mapping()). Right?
> >
> > I think that's doable. So assuming we're still talking about requiring
> > cap_sys_admin then we'd roughly have sm like:
> >
> > if (fc->allow_other)
> > return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns) ||
> > (capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> > fsuidgid_has_mapping(..., &init_user_ns));
>
> No, I meant this:
>
> if (fc->allow_other)
> return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns) ||
> (userns_allow_other &&
> fsuidgid_has_mapping(..., &init_user_ns));
>
> But I think the OP wanted to allow real root to access the fs, which
> this doesn't allow (since 0 will have no mapping in the user ns), so
> I'm not sure what's the right solution...
Right, so I was basically asking why not do something like this:
$ git diff
diff --git a/fs/fuse/dir.c b/fs/fuse/dir.c
index 74303d6e987b..8c04955eb26e 100644
--- a/fs/fuse/dir.c
+++ b/fs/fuse/dir.c
@@ -1224,6 +1224,9 @@ int fuse_allow_current_process(struct fuse_conn *fc)
{
const struct cred *cred;
+ if (fuse_allow_sys_admin_access && capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return 1;
+
if (fc->allow_other)
return current_in_userns(fc->user_ns);
where fuse_allow_sys_admin_access is module param which has to be
opted into through sysfs?
>
> Maybe the original patch is fine: this check isn't meant to protect
> the filesystem from access, it's meant to protect the accessor.
>
> Thanks,
> Miklos
