On 7/7/2025 1:03 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote: > This reverts commit 3267cb6d3a174ff83d6287dcd5b0047bbd912452. > > LASS mitigates the Spectre based on LAM (SLAM) [1] and the previous > commit made LAM depend on LASS, so we no longer need to disable LAM at > compile time, so revert the commit that disables LAM. > Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@xxxxxxxxx> You may have missed my comments in the previous revision. https://lore.kernel.org/all/af709ffa-eb11-4de5-9ae8-a179cb99750c@xxxxxxxxx/ Mainly, x86 maintainers prefer imperative tone and references such as "previous commit" can be confusing sometimes. > Adjust USER_PTR_MAX if LAM enabled, allowing tag bits to be set for > userspace pointers. The value for the constant is defined in a way to > avoid overflow compiler warning on 32-bit config. > > [1] https://download.vusec.net/papers/slam_sp24.pdf > > Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 - > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 5 +---- > 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 5 deletions(-) >