Re: [PATCHv8 03/17] x86/alternatives: Disable LASS when patching kernel alternatives

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On 7/1/2025 2:58 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>  
> +/*
> + * The CLAC/STAC instructions toggle the enforcement of X86_FEATURE_SMAP and
> + * X86_FEATURE_LASS.
> + *
> + * SMAP enforcement is based on the _PAGE_BIT_USER bit in the page tables: the
> + * kernel is not allowed to touch pages with the bit set unless the AC bit is
> + * set.
> + *
> + * LASS enforcement is based on bit 63 of the virtual address. The kernel is
> + * not allowed to touch memory in the lower half of the virtual address space
> + * unless the AC bit is set.
> + *
> + * Use stac()/clac() when accessing userspace (_PAGE_USER) mappings,
> + * regardless of location.
> + *
> + * Use lass_stac()/lass_clac() when accessing kernel mappings (!_PAGE_USER)
> + * in the lower half of the address space.
> + *
> + * Note: a barrier is implicit in alternative().
> + */
> +
Thank you for incorporating my feedback. I like the updated wording.




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