There's nothing entry-specific about entry_ibpb(). In preparation for calling it from elsewhere, rename it to __write_ibpb(). Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@xxxxxxxxxx> --- arch/x86/entry/entry.S | 7 ++++--- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 +++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S index d3caa31240ed..3a53319988b9 100644 --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry.S +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry.S @@ -17,7 +17,8 @@ .pushsection .noinstr.text, "ax" -SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb) +// Clobbers AX, CX, DX +SYM_FUNC_START(__write_ibpb) ANNOTATE_NOENDBR movl $MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, %ecx movl $PRED_CMD_IBPB, %eax @@ -27,9 +28,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_ibpb) /* Make sure IBPB clears return stack preductions too. */ FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %rax, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET RET -SYM_FUNC_END(entry_ibpb) +SYM_FUNC_END(__write_ibpb) /* For KVM */ -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(entry_ibpb); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__write_ibpb); .popsection diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 8a5cc8e70439..bbac79cad04c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ * typically has NO_MELTDOWN). * * While retbleed_untrain_ret() doesn't clobber anything but requires stack, - * entry_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX. + * __write_ibpb() will clobber AX, CX, DX. * * As such, this must be placed after every *SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 at a point * where we have a stack but before any RET instruction. @@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ VALIDATE_UNRET_END CALL_UNTRAIN_RET ALTERNATIVE_2 "", \ - "call entry_ibpb", \ibpb_feature, \ + "call __write_ibpb", \ibpb_feature, \ __stringify(\call_depth_insns), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH #endif .endm @@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ extern void srso_return_thunk(void); extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void); extern void entry_untrain_ret(void); -extern void entry_ibpb(void); +extern void __write_ibpb(void); #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 extern void clear_bhb_loop(void); diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 4386aa6c69e1..310cb3f7139c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1142,7 +1142,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); /* - * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures + * There is no need for RSB filling: __write_ibpb() ensures * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, * regardless of IBPB implementation. */ @@ -2676,7 +2676,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK); /* - * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures + * There is no need for RSB filling: __write_ibpb() ensures * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, * regardless of IBPB implementation. */ @@ -2701,7 +2701,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void) srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT; /* - * There is no need for RSB filling: entry_ibpb() ensures + * There is no need for RSB filling: __write_ibpb() ensures * all predictions, including the RSB, are invalidated, * regardless of IBPB implementation. */ -- 2.48.1
