From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Add EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC (6) to reflect the user executable
permissions of a given address when Intel MBEC is enabled.
Refactor usage of EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT to understand all of the
specific bits that are now possible with MBEC.
Intel SDM 'Exit Qualification for EPT Violations' states the following
for Bit 6.
If the “mode-based execute control” VM-execution control is 0, the
value of this bit is undefined. If that control is 1, this bit is
the logical-AND of bit 10 in the EPT paging-structure entries used
to translate the guest-physical address of the access causing the
EPT violation. In this case, it indicates whether the guest-physical
address was executable for user-mode linear addresses.
Bit 6 is cleared to 0 if (1) the “mode-based execute control”
VM-execution control is 1; and (2) either (a) any of EPT
paging-structure entries used to translate the guest-physical address
of the access causing the EPT violation is not present; or
(b) 4-level EPT is in use and the guest-physical address sets any
bits in the range 51:48.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: Jon Kohler <jon@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 7 ++++---
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 15 ++++++++++++---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 7 +++++--
3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
index ffc90d672b5d..84c5be416f5c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -587,6 +587,7 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ BIT(3)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE BIT(4)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC BIT(5)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC BIT(6)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ | \
EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | \
EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC)
@@ -596,7 +597,7 @@ enum vm_entry_failure_code {
#define EPT_VIOLATION_READ_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) << 3)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) << 3)
#define EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) << 3)
-#define EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK) << 3)
+#define EPT_VIOLATION_USER_EXEC_TO_PROT(__epte) (((__epte) & VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK) >> 4)
static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_READ_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ==
(EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ));
@@ -604,8 +605,8 @@ static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ==
(EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE));
static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ==
(EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC));
-static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK) ==
- (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_READ | EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_WRITE | EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_EXEC));
+static_assert(EPT_VIOLATION_USER_EXEC_TO_PROT(VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ==
+ (EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC));
/*
* Exit Qualifications for NOTIFY VM EXIT
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
index 9bc3fc4a238b..a3a5cacda614 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h
@@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ static inline unsigned FNAME(gpte_access)(u64 gpte)
unsigned access;
#if PTTYPE == PTTYPE_EPT
access = ((gpte & VMX_EPT_WRITABLE_MASK) ? ACC_WRITE_MASK : 0) |
- ((gpte & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_EXEC_MASK : 0) |
- ((gpte & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_MASK : 0);
+ ((gpte & VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_EXEC_MASK : 0) |
+ ((gpte & VMX_EPT_USER_EXECUTABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_EXEC_MASK : 0) |
+ ((gpte & VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK) ? ACC_USER_MASK : 0);
#else
BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != PT_PRESENT_MASK);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ACC_EXEC_MASK != 1);
@@ -510,7 +511,15 @@ static int FNAME(walk_addr_generic)(struct guest_walker *walker,
* Note, pte_access holds the raw RWX bits from the EPTE, not
* ACC_*_MASK flags!
*/
- walker->fault.exit_qualification |= EPT_VIOLATION_RWX_TO_PROT(pte_access);
+ walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+ EPT_VIOLATION_READ_TO_PROT(pte_access);
+ walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+ EPT_VIOLATION_WRITE_TO_PROT(pte_access);
+ walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+ EPT_VIOLATION_EXEC_TO_PROT(pte_access);
+ if (vcpu->arch.pt_guest_exec_control)
+ walker->fault.exit_qualification |=
+ EPT_VIOLATION_USER_EXEC_TO_PROT(pte_access);
}
#endif
walker->fault.address = addr;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 116910159a3f..0aadfa924045 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5809,7 +5809,7 @@ static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
+ unsigned long exit_qualification, rwx_mask;
gpa_t gpa;
u64 error_code;
@@ -5839,7 +5839,10 @@ static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
/* ept page table entry is present? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK)
+ rwx_mask = EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_MASK;
+ if (vcpu->arch.pt_guest_exec_control)
+ rwx_mask |= EPT_VIOLATION_PROT_USER_EXEC;
+ error_code |= (exit_qualification & rwx_mask)
? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
if (error_code & EPT_VIOLATION_GVA_IS_VALID)
--
2.43.0
