On Mon, Mar 03, 2025 at 03:05:56PM +0000, Patrick Bellasi wrote:
> That's why we are also going to detect this cases and set
> SRSO_MITIGATION_BP_SPEC_REDUCE_NA, so that we get a:
>
> "Vulnerable: Reduced Speculation, not available"
>
> from vulnerabilities/spec_rstack_overflow, which should be the only place users
> look for to assess the effective mitigation posture, ins't it?
If they even look. The strategy so far has been that the kernel should simply
DTRT (it being the default) if the user doesn't know anything about
mitigations etc.
So I have another idea: how about we upstream enough ASI bits - i.e., the
function which checks whether ASI is enabled - and use that in the mitigation
selection?
IOW:
case SRSO_CMD_BP_SPEC_REDUCE:
if ((boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_BP_SPEC_REDUCE)) {
select it
} else {
if (ASI enabled)
do not fall back to IBPB;
else
fallback to IBPB;
}
"ASI enabled" will return false upstream - at least initially only, until ASI
is out-of-tree - and then it'll fall back.
On your kernels, it'll return true and there it won't fall back.
We just need to sync with Brendan what "ASI enabled" would be and then it
should work and your backports would be easy in that respect.
Until ASI is not upstream, that is.
Hmmmm?
Thx.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
