[Last-Call] Re: [TLS] Re: draft-ietf-tls-keylogfile-04 ietf last call Opsdir review

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Recall that you need both the key log AND access to the TLS connection itself.  That needs to be in real-time if you are mounting an attack that involves modifying stuff; or packet captures if you just want to look at the content (like with Wireshark).

This is an important point.  In the security area, dividing things into *two* parts is a very good thing.


Either way, I can't see how NULL encryption is ever better.

Strongly agree.

 

My networking colleagues tell me that routers generally store certs and private keys in plaintext and you have to upload them that way.

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