On Tue, Apr 8, 2025 at 9:06 AM Toerless Eckert <tte@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
Dear IESG, *:
We received IESG review for draft-ietf-anima-brski-prm that was asking to
make the use of TLS 1.3 mandatory based on the expectation that draft-ietf-uta-require-tls13
would become RFC - unless we provide sufficient justification in our (prm) draft.
I would like to point out, that it is the current version of draft-ietf-uta-require-tls13
whose core applicability reasoning is misleading:
"since TLS 1.3 use is widespread, ...
new protocols that use TLS must require and assume its existence
This is not correct. Correct would be is:
"since TLS 1.3 use is widespread in browser, ...
new protocols that use browsers and TLS must require its use and assume its existence,
protocols not using browsers must recommend its use and assume its existance
I don't agree that this change is indicated. TLS 1.3 is far more widespread
than just in browsers. It's been in major libraries for years and is supported
in the Windows, MacOS, iOS, and Android stacks. This is not to say that
there aren't environments which don't support TLS 1.3, but it's far more
than just browsers.
Recommending, but not requiring the use of TLS 1.3 is unfortunately necessary for
quite a while for the much larger space of IOT equipment and protocols written
for non-browser enviroments where IOT equipment is important to be supported.
Such IOT equipment often comes with SDK that can not be upgraded for long periods of
time, sometimes as long as 10 years or longer, and/or solutions where upgrade of SDK
(including OS) would require very expensive re-certification such as FIPS 140 or
required regulatory requirements.
If you think this is not appropriate, then please stop flying planes, because
planes are one example of systems in which basic systems are not possible to rewrite
from scratch because they can not for various, including financial reasons be
re-qualified at such a base level.
As Alan observes, we are talking about levies on new protocols, not
existing protocols. These should be deployed with TLS 1.3 for the reasons
indicated in this draft.
-Ekr
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