Re: [PATCH v1 bpf-next 08/11] bpf, x86: add support for indirect jumps

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On Sat, 2025-08-16 at 18:06 +0000, Anton Protopopov wrote:

> Add support for a new instruction
>
>     BPF_JMP|BPF_X|BPF_JA, SRC=0, DST=Rx, off=0[, imm=fd(M)]
                                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^
					Do we really need to support this now?

[...]

> diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> index 4bfb4faab4d7..f419a89b0147 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> @@ -671,9 +671,11 @@ static void __emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, bool ereg)
>  	*pprog = prog;
>  }
>  
> -static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, bool ereg, u8 *ip)
> +static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int bpf_reg, u8 *ip)

Nit: maybe make this change a part of the previous patch?

>  {
>  	u8 *prog = *pprog;
> +	int reg = reg2hex[bpf_reg];
> +	bool ereg = is_ereg(bpf_reg);
>  
>  	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_INDIRECT_THUNK_ITS)) {
>  		OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(reg);

[...]

> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> index aca43c284203..6e68e0082c81 100644
> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
> @@ -77,7 +77,15 @@ struct bpf_reg_state {
>  			 * the map_uid is non-zero for registers
>  			 * pointing to inner maps.
>  			 */
> -			u32 map_uid;
> +			union {
> +				u32 map_uid;
> +
> +				/* Used to track boundaries of a PTR_TO_INSN */
> +				struct {
> +					u32 min_index;
> +					u32 max_index;

Could you please elaborate why these fields are necessary?
It appears that .var_off/.{s,u}{32_,}{min,max}_value fields can be
used to track current index bounds (min/max fields for bounds,
.var_off field to check 8-byte alignment).

> +				};
> +			};
>  		};
>  
>  		/* for PTR_TO_BTF_ID */
> @@ -542,6 +550,11 @@ struct bpf_insn_aux_data {
>  		struct {
>  			u32 map_index;		/* index into used_maps[] */
>  			u32 map_off;		/* offset from value base address */
> +
> +			struct jt {		/* jump table for gotox instruction */
                               ^^
		  should this be anonymous or have a `bpf_` prefix?

> +				u32 *off;
> +				int off_cnt;
> +			} jt;
>  		};
>  		struct {
>  			enum bpf_reg_type reg_type;	/* type of pseudo_btf_id */

[...]

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_insn_array.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_insn_array.c
> index 0c8dac62f457..d077a5aa2c7c 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_insn_array.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_insn_array.c
> @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
>  // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>  
>  #include <linux/bpf.h>
> -#include <linux/sort.h>
>  
>  #define MAX_INSN_ARRAY_ENTRIES 256
>  
> @@ -173,6 +172,20 @@ static u64 insn_array_mem_usage(const struct bpf_map *map)
>  	return insn_array_alloc_size(map->max_entries) + extra_size;
>  }
>  
> +static int insn_array_map_direct_value_addr(const struct bpf_map *map, u64 *imm, u32 off)
> +{
> +	struct bpf_insn_array *insn_array = cast_insn_array(map);
> +
> +	if ((off % sizeof(long)) != 0 ||
> +	    (off / sizeof(long)) >= map->max_entries)
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +
> +	/* from BPF's point of view, this map is a jump table */
> +	*imm = (unsigned long)insn_array->ips + off / sizeof(long);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +

This function is called during main verification pass by
verifier.c:check_mem_access() -> verifier.c:bpf_map_direct_read().
However, insn_array->ips is filled by bpf_jit_comp.c:do_jit()
bpf_insn_array.c:bpf_prog_update_insn_ptr(), which is called *after*
main verification pass. Do I miss something, or this can't work?

>  BTF_ID_LIST_SINGLE(insn_array_btf_ids, struct, bpf_insn_array)
>  
>  const struct bpf_map_ops insn_array_map_ops = {

[...]

> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index 863b7114866b..c2cfa55913f8 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c

[...]

> @@ -6072,6 +6084,14 @@ static int check_map_kptr_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +static u32 map_mem_size(const struct bpf_map *map)

Nit: It is a bit non-obvious why this function returns the size of a
     single value for all map types except insn array. Maybe add a
     comment here, something like:

       Return the size of the memory region accessible from a pointer
       to map value. For INSN_ARRAY maps whole bpf_insn_array->ips
       array is accessible.

> +{
> +	if (map->map_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY)
> +		return map->max_entries * sizeof(long);
  		       			  ^^^^^^^^^^^^
		Nit: sizeof_field(struct bpf_insn_array, ips) ?
> +
> +	return map->value_size;
> +}
> +
>  /* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */
>  static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
>  			    int off, int size, bool zero_size_allowed,

[...]

> @@ -7820,6 +7849,13 @@ static int check_load_mem(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,
>  				       allow_trust_mismatch);
>  	err = err ?: reg_bounds_sanity_check(env, &regs[insn->dst_reg], ctx);
>  
> +	if (map_ptr_copy) {
> +		regs[insn->dst_reg].type = PTR_TO_INSN;
> +		regs[insn->dst_reg].map_ptr = map_ptr_copy;
> +		regs[insn->dst_reg].min_index = regs[insn->src_reg].min_index;
> +		regs[insn->dst_reg].max_index = regs[insn->src_reg].max_index;
> +	}
> +

I think this should be handled inside check_mem_access(), see case for
reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE.

>  	return err;
>  }
>  

[...]

> @@ -14554,6 +14592,36 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>  
>  	switch (opcode) {
>  	case BPF_ADD:
> +		if (ptr_to_insn_array) {
> +			u32 min_index = dst_reg->min_index;
> +			u32 max_index = dst_reg->max_index;
> +
> +			if ((umin_val + ptr_reg->off) > (u64) U32_MAX * sizeof(long)) {
> +				verbose(env, "umin_value %llu + offset %u is too big to convert to index\n",
> +					     umin_val, ptr_reg->off);
> +				return -EACCES;
> +			}
> +			if ((umax_val + ptr_reg->off) > (u64) U32_MAX * sizeof(long)) {
> +				verbose(env, "umax_value %llu + offset %u is too big to convert to index\n",
> +					     umax_val, ptr_reg->off);
> +				return -EACCES;
> +			}
> +
> +			min_index += (umin_val + ptr_reg->off) / sizeof(long);
> +			max_index += (umax_val + ptr_reg->off) / sizeof(long);
> +
> +			if (min_index >= ptr_reg->map_ptr->max_entries) {
> +				verbose(env, "min_index %u points to outside of map\n", min_index);
> +				return -EACCES;
> +			}
> +			if (max_index >= ptr_reg->map_ptr->max_entries) {
> +				verbose(env, "max_index %u points to outside of map\n", max_index);
> +				return -EACCES;
> +			}
> +
> +			dst_reg->min_index = min_index;
> +			dst_reg->max_index = max_index;
> +		}

I think this and the following hunk would disappear if {min,max}_index
are replaced by regular offset tracking mechanics.

>  		/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
>  		 * the s32 'off' field
>  		 */
> @@ -14598,6 +14666,11 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>  		}
>  		break;
>  	case BPF_SUB:
> +		if (ptr_to_insn_array) {
> +			verbose(env, "Operation %s on ptr to instruction set map is prohibited\n",
> +				bpf_alu_string[opcode >> 4]);
> +			return -EACCES;
> +		}
>  		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
>  			/* scalar -= pointer.  Creates an unknown scalar */
>  			verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
> @@ -16943,7 +17016,8 @@ static int check_ld_imm(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
>  		}
>  		dst_reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
>  		dst_reg->off = aux->map_off;
> -		WARN_ON_ONCE(map->max_entries != 1);
> +		WARN_ON_ONCE(map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY &&
> +			     map->max_entries != 1);

Q: when is this necessary?

>  		/* We want reg->id to be same (0) as map_value is not distinct */
>  	} else if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD ||
>  		   insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_IDX) {
> @@ -17696,6 +17770,246 @@ static int mark_fastcall_patterns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +#define SET_HIGH(STATE, LAST)	STATE = (STATE & 0xffffU) | ((LAST) << 16)
> +#define GET_HIGH(STATE)		((u16)((STATE) >> 16))
> +
> +static int push_goto_x_edge(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct jt *jt)

I think check_cfg() can be refactored to use insn_successors().
In such a case it won't be necessary to special case gotox processing
(appart from insn_aux->jt allocation).

> +{
> +	int *insn_stack = env->cfg.insn_stack;
> +	int *insn_state = env->cfg.insn_state;
> +	u16 prev;
> +	int w;
> +
> +	for (prev = GET_HIGH(insn_state[t]); prev < jt->off_cnt; prev++) {
> +		w = jt->off[prev];
> +
> +		/* EXPLORED || DISCOVERED */
> +		if (insn_state[w])
> +			continue;
> +
> +		break;
> +	}
> +
> +	if (prev == jt->off_cnt)
> +		return DONE_EXPLORING;
> +
> +	mark_prune_point(env, t);
> +
> +	if (env->cfg.cur_stack >= env->prog->len)
> +		return -E2BIG;
> +	insn_stack[env->cfg.cur_stack++] = w;
> +
> +	mark_jmp_point(env, w);
> +
> +	SET_HIGH(insn_state[t], prev + 1);
> +	return KEEP_EXPLORING;
> +}
> +
> +static int copy_insn_array(struct bpf_map *map, u32 start, u32 end, u32 *off)
> +{
> +	struct bpf_insn_array_value *value;
> +	u32 i;
> +
> +	for (i = start; i <= end; i++) {
> +		value = map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, &i);
> +		if (!value)
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		off[i - start] = value->xlated_off;
> +	}
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int cmp_ptr_to_u32(const void *a, const void *b)
> +{
> +	return *(u32 *)a - *(u32 *)b;
> +}

This will overflow for e.g. `0 - 8`.

> +
> +static int sort_insn_array_uniq(u32 *off, int off_cnt)
> +{
> +	int unique = 1;
> +	int i;
> +
> +	sort(off, off_cnt, sizeof(off[0]), cmp_ptr_to_u32, NULL);
> +
> +	for (i = 1; i < off_cnt; i++)
> +		if (off[i] != off[unique - 1])
> +			off[unique++] = off[i];
> +
> +	return unique;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * sort_unique({map[start], ..., map[end]}) into off
> + */
> +static int copy_insn_array_uniq(struct bpf_map *map, u32 start, u32 end, u32 *off)
> +{
> +	u32 n = end - start + 1;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	err = copy_insn_array(map, start, end, off);
> +	if (err)
> +		return err;
> +
> +	return sort_insn_array_uniq(off, n);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Copy all unique offsets from the map
> + */
> +static int jt_from_map(struct bpf_map *map, struct jt *jt)
> +{
> +	u32 *off;
> +	int n;
> +
> +	off = kvcalloc(map->max_entries, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> +	if (!off)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	n = copy_insn_array_uniq(map, 0, map->max_entries - 1, off);
> +	if (n < 0) {
> +		kvfree(off);
> +		return n;
> +	}
> +
> +	jt->off = off;
> +	jt->off_cnt = n;
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Find and collect all maps which fit in the subprog. Return the result as one
> + * combined jump table in jt->off (allocated with kvcalloc
> + */
> +static int jt_from_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> +			   int subprog_start,
> +			   int subprog_end,
> +			   struct jt *jt)
> +{
> +	struct bpf_map *map;
> +	struct jt jt_cur;
> +	u32 *off;
> +	int err;
> +	int i;
> +
> +	jt->off = NULL;
> +	jt->off_cnt = 0;
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < env->insn_array_map_cnt; i++) {
> +		/*
> +		 * TODO (when needed): collect only jump tables, not static keys
> +		 * or maps for indirect calls
> +		 */
> +		map = env->insn_array_maps[i];
> +
> +		err = jt_from_map(map, &jt_cur);
> +		if (err) {
> +			kvfree(jt->off);
> +			return err;
> +		}
> +
> +		/*
> +		 * This is enough to check one element. The full table is
> +		 * checked to fit inside the subprog later in create_jt()
> +		 */
> +		if (jt_cur.off[0] >= subprog_start && jt_cur.off[0] < subprog_end) {

This won't always catch cases when insn array references offsets from
several subprograms. Also is one subprogram limitation really necessary?

> +			off = kvrealloc(jt->off, (jt->off_cnt + jt_cur.off_cnt) << 2, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> +			if (!off) {
> +				kvfree(jt_cur.off);
> +				kvfree(jt->off);
> +				return -ENOMEM;
> +			}
> +			memcpy(off + jt->off_cnt, jt_cur.off, jt_cur.off_cnt << 2);
> +			jt->off = off;
> +			jt->off_cnt += jt_cur.off_cnt;
> +		}
> +
> +		kvfree(jt_cur.off);
> +	}
> +
> +	if (jt->off == NULL) {
> +		verbose(env, "no jump tables found for subprog starting at %u\n", subprog_start);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	jt->off_cnt = sort_insn_array_uniq(jt->off, jt->off_cnt);
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int create_jt(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int fd, struct jt *jt)
> +{
> +	static struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog;
> +	int subprog_idx, subprog_start, subprog_end;
> +	struct bpf_map *map;
> +	int map_idx;
> +	int ret;
> +	int i;
> +
> +	if (env->subprog_cnt == 0)
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	subprog_idx = find_containing_subprog_idx(env, t);
> +	if (subprog_idx < 0) {
> +		verbose(env, "can't find subprog containing instruction %d\n", t);
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +	}
> +	subprog = &env->subprog_info[subprog_idx];
> +	subprog_start = subprog->start;
> +	subprog_end = (subprog + 1)->start;
> +
> +	map_idx = add_used_map(env, fd);

Will this spam the log with bogus
"fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n" messages if gotox does not
specify fd?

> +	if (map_idx >= 0) {
> +		map = env->used_maps[map_idx];
> +		if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY) {
> +			verbose(env, "map type %d in the gotox insn %d is incorrect\n",
> +				     map->map_type, t);
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		}
> +
> +		env->insn_aux_data[t].map_index = map_idx;
> +
> +		ret = jt_from_map(map, jt);
> +		if (ret)
> +			return ret;
> +	} else {
> +		ret = jt_from_subprog(env, subprog_start, subprog_end, jt);
> +		if (ret)
> +			return ret;
> +	}
> +
> +	/* Check that the every element of the jump table fits within the given subprogram */
> +	for (i = 0; i < jt->off_cnt; i++) {
> +		if (jt->off[i] < subprog_start || jt->off[i] >= subprog_end) {
> +			verbose(env, "jump table for insn %d points outside of the subprog [%u,%u]",
> +					t, subprog_start, subprog_end);
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +		}
> +	}
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +
> +/* "conditional jump with N edges" */
> +static int visit_goto_x_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int fd)
> +{
> +	struct jt *jt = &env->insn_aux_data[t].jt;
> +	int ret;
> +
> +	if (jt->off == NULL) {
> +		ret = create_jt(t, env, fd, jt);
> +		if (ret)
> +			return ret;
> +	}
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * Mark jt as allocated. Otherwise, this is not possible to check if it
> +	 * was allocated or not in the code which frees memory (jt is a part of
> +	 * union)
> +	 */
> +	env->insn_aux_data[t].jt_allocated = true;
> +
> +	return push_goto_x_edge(t, env, jt);
> +}
> +
>  /* Visits the instruction at index t and returns one of the following:
>   *  < 0 - an error occurred
>   *  DONE_EXPLORING - the instruction was fully explored
> @@ -17786,8 +18100,8 @@ static int visit_insn(int t, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
>  		return visit_func_call_insn(t, insns, env, insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL);
>  
>  	case BPF_JA:
> -		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_K)
> -			return -EINVAL;
> +		if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X)
> +			return visit_goto_x_insn(t, env, insn->imm);
>  
>  		if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_JMP)
>  			off = insn->off;

[...]

> @@ -18679,6 +19000,10 @@ static bool regsafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *rold,
>  		return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap) && rold->frameno == rcur->frameno;
>  	case PTR_TO_ARENA:
>  		return true;
> +	case PTR_TO_INSN:
> +		/* cur ⊆ old */

Out of curiosity: are unicode symbols allowed in kernel source code?

> +		return (rcur->min_index >= rold->min_index &&
> +			rcur->max_index <= rold->max_index);
>  	default:
>  		return regs_exact(rold, rcur, idmap);
>  	}
> @@ -19825,6 +20150,67 @@ static int process_bpf_exit_full(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
>  	return PROCESS_BPF_EXIT;
>  }
>  
> +/* gotox *dst_reg */
> +static int check_indirect_jump(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)
> +{
> +	struct bpf_verifier_state *other_branch;
> +	struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg;
> +	struct bpf_map *map;
> +	int err = 0;
> +	u32 *xoff;
> +	int n;
> +	int i;
> +
> +	dst_reg = reg_state(env, insn->dst_reg);
> +	if (dst_reg->type != PTR_TO_INSN) {
> +		verbose(env, "BPF_JA|BPF_X R%d has type %d, expected PTR_TO_INSN\n",
> +				insn->dst_reg, dst_reg->type);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	map = dst_reg->map_ptr;
> +	if (!map)
> +		return -EINVAL;

Is this a verifier bug or legit situation?
If it is a bug, maybe add a verifier_bug() here and return -EFAULT?

> +
> +	if (map->map_type != BPF_MAP_TYPE_INSN_ARRAY)
> +		return -EINVAL;

Same question here, ->type is already `PTR_TO_INSN`.

> +
> +	if (dst_reg->max_index >= map->max_entries) {
> +		verbose(env, "BPF_JA|BPF_X R%d is out of map boundaries: index=%u, max_index=%u\n",
> +				insn->dst_reg, dst_reg->max_index, map->max_entries-1);
> +		return -EINVAL;
> +	}
> +
> +	xoff = kvcalloc(dst_reg->max_index - dst_reg->min_index + 1, sizeof(u32), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
> +	if (!xoff)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	n = copy_insn_array_uniq(map, dst_reg->min_index, dst_reg->max_index, xoff);

Nit: I'd avoid this allocation and do a loop for(i = min_index; i <= max_index; i++),
     with map->ops->map_lookup_elem(map, &i) (or a wrapper) inside it.

> +	if (n < 0) {
> +		err = n;
> +		goto free_off;
> +	}
> +	if (n == 0) {
> +		verbose(env, "register R%d doesn't point to any offset in map id=%d\n",
> +			     insn->dst_reg, map->id);
> +		err = -EINVAL;
> +		goto free_off;
> +	}
> +
> +	for (i = 0; i < n - 1; i++) {
> +		other_branch = push_stack(env, xoff[i], env->insn_idx, false);
> +		if (IS_ERR(other_branch)) {
> +			err = PTR_ERR(other_branch);
> +			goto free_off;
> +		}
> +	}
> +	env->insn_idx = xoff[n-1];
> +
> +free_off:
> +	kvfree(xoff);
> +	return err;
> +}
> +
>  static int do_check_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool *do_print_state)
>  {
>  	int err;

[...]

> @@ -20981,6 +21371,23 @@ static int bpf_adj_linfo_after_remove(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off,
>  	return 0;
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Clean up dynamically allocated fields of aux data for instructions [start, ..., end]
> + */
> +static void clear_insn_aux_data(struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data, int start, int end)

Nit: switching this to (..., int start, int len) would simplify arithmetic at call sites.

> +{
> +	int i;
> +
> +	for (i = start; i <= end; i++) {
> +		if (aux_data[i].jt_allocated) {
> +			kvfree(aux_data[i].jt.off);
> +			aux_data[i].jt.off = NULL;
> +			aux_data[i].jt.off_cnt = 0;
> +			aux_data[i].jt_allocated = false;
> +		}
> +	}
> +}
> +
>  static int verifier_remove_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 off, u32 cnt)
>  {
>  	struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux_data = env->insn_aux_data;

[...]

> @@ -24175,18 +24586,18 @@ static bool can_jump(struct bpf_insn *insn)
>  	return false;
>  }
>  
> -static int insn_successors(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 idx, u32 succ[2])
> +static int insn_successors_regular(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 insn_idx, u32 *succ)
>  {
> -	struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[idx];
> +	struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
>  	int i = 0, insn_sz;
>  	u32 dst;
>  
>  	insn_sz = bpf_is_ldimm64(insn) ? 2 : 1;
> -	if (can_fallthrough(insn) && idx + 1 < prog->len)
> -		succ[i++] = idx + insn_sz;
> +	if (can_fallthrough(insn) && insn_idx + 1 < prog->len)
> +		succ[i++] = insn_idx + insn_sz;
>  
>  	if (can_jump(insn)) {
> -		dst = idx + jmp_offset(insn) + 1;
> +		dst = insn_idx + jmp_offset(insn) + 1;
>  		if (i == 0 || succ[0] != dst)
>  			succ[i++] = dst;
>  	}
> @@ -24194,6 +24605,36 @@ static int insn_successors(struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 idx, u32 succ[2])
>  	return i;
>  }
>  
> +static int insn_successors_gotox(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> +				 struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +				 u32 insn_idx, u32 **succ)
> +{
> +	struct jt *jt = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].jt;
> +
> +	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!jt->off || !jt->off_cnt))
> +		return -EFAULT;
> +
> +	*succ = jt->off;
> +	return jt->off_cnt;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * Fill in *succ[0],...,*succ[n-1] with successors. The default *succ
> + * pointer (of size 2) may be replaced with a custom one if more
> + * elements are required (i.e., an indirect jump).
> + */
> +static int insn_successors(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> +			   struct bpf_prog *prog,
> +			   u32 insn_idx, u32 **succ)
> +{
> +	struct bpf_insn *insn = &prog->insnsi[insn_idx];
> +
> +	if (unlikely(insn_is_gotox(insn)))
> +		return insn_successors_gotox(env, prog, insn_idx, succ);
> +
> +	return insn_successors_regular(prog, insn_idx, *succ);
> +}
> +

The `prog` parameter can be dropped, as it is accessible from `env`.
I don't like the `u32 **succ` part of this interface.
What about one of the following alternatives:

- u32 *insn_successors(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx)
  and `u32 succ_buf[2]` added to bpf_verifier_env?

- int insn_successor(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx, u32 succ_num):
	bool fallthrough = can_fallthrough(insn);
	bool jump = can_jump(insn);
	if (succ_num == 0) {
		if (fallthrough)
			return <next insn>
		if (jump)
			return <jump tgt>
	} else if (succ_num == 1) {
		if (fallthrough && jump)
			return <jmp tgt>
	} else if (is_gotox) {
		return <lookup>
	}
	return -1;
  
?

>  /* Each field is a register bitmask */
>  struct insn_live_regs {
>  	u16 use;	/* registers read by instruction */
> @@ -24387,11 +24828,17 @@ static int compute_live_registers(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)

Could you please extend `tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/compute_live_registers.c`
with test cases for gotox?

>  			int insn_idx = env->cfg.insn_postorder[i];
>  			struct insn_live_regs *live = &state[insn_idx];
>  			int succ_num;
> -			u32 succ[2];
> +			u32 _succ[2];
> +			u32 *succ = &_succ[0];
>  			u16 new_out = 0;
>  			u16 new_in = 0;
>  
> -			succ_num = insn_successors(env->prog, insn_idx, succ);
> +			succ_num = insn_successors(env, env->prog, insn_idx, &succ);
> +			if (succ_num < 0) {
> +				err = succ_num;
> +				goto out;
> +
> +			}
>  			for (int s = 0; s < succ_num; ++s)
>  				new_out |= state[succ[s]].in;
>  			new_in = (new_out & ~live->def) | live->use;

[...]





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