On Wed, Sep 10, 2025 at 10:44:43AM +0800, Yafang Shao wrote:
> The vma->vm_mm might be NULL and it can be accessed outside of RCU. Thus,
> we can mark it as trusted_or_null. With this change, BPF helpers can safely
> access vma->vm_mm to retrieve the associated mm_struct from the VMA.
> Then we can make policy decision from the VMA.
>
> The lsm selftest must be modified because it directly accesses vma->vm_mm
> without a NULL pointer check; otherwise it will break due to this
> change.
>
> For the VMA based THP policy, the use case is as follows,
>
> @mm = @vma->vm_mm; // vm_area_struct::vm_mm is trusted or null
> if (!@mm)
> return;
> bpf_rcu_read_lock(); // rcu lock must be held to dereference the owner
> @owner = @mm->owner; // mm_struct::owner is rcu trusted or null
> if (!@owner)
> goto out;
> @cgroup1 = bpf_task_get_cgroup1(@owner, MEMCG_HIERARCHY_ID);
>
> /* make the decision based on the @cgroup1 attribute */
>
> bpf_cgroup_release(@cgroup1); // release the associated cgroup
> out:
> bpf_rcu_read_unlock();
>
> PSI memory information can be obtained from the associated cgroup to inform
> policy decisions. Since upstream PSI support is currently limited to cgroup
> v2, the following example demonstrates cgroup v2 implementation:
>
> @owner = @mm->owner;
> if (@owner) {
> // @ancestor_cgid is user-configured
> @ancestor = bpf_cgroup_from_id(@ancestor_cgid);
> if (bpf_task_under_cgroup(@owner, @ancestor)) {
> @psi_group = @ancestor->psi;
>
> /* Extract PSI metrics from @psi_group and
> * implement policy logic based on the values
> */
>
> }
> }
>
> Signed-off-by: Yafang Shao <laoar.shao@xxxxxxxxx>
Again more for BPF guys, but seems sensible, so:
Acked-by: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes <lorenzo.stoakes@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++++
> tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c | 8 +++++---
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> index d400e18ee31e..b708b98f796c 100644
> --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
> @@ -7165,6 +7165,10 @@ BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket) {
> struct sock *sk;
> };
>
> +BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct) {
> + struct mm_struct *vm_mm;
> +};
> +
> static bool type_is_rcu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
> const char *field_name, u32 btf_id)
> @@ -7206,6 +7210,7 @@ static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
> {
> BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct socket));
> BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct dentry));
> + BTF_TYPE_EMIT(BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED_OR_NULL(struct vm_area_struct));
>
> return btf_nested_type_is_trusted(&env->log, reg, field_name, btf_id,
> "__safe_trusted_or_null");
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> index 0c13b7409947..7de173daf27b 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm.c
> @@ -89,14 +89,16 @@ SEC("lsm/file_mprotect")
> int BPF_PROG(test_int_hook, struct vm_area_struct *vma,
> unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot, int ret)
> {
> - if (ret != 0)
> + struct mm_struct *mm = vma->vm_mm;
> +
> + if (ret != 0 || !mm)
> return ret;
>
> __s32 pid = bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32;
> int is_stack = 0;
>
> - is_stack = (vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
> - vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack);
> + is_stack = (vma->vm_start <= mm->start_stack &&
> + vma->vm_end >= mm->start_stack);
>
> if (is_stack && monitored_pid == pid) {
> mprotect_count++;
> --
> 2.47.3
>
