Re: [syzbot] [bpf?] WARNING in reg_bounds_sanity_check

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

 



On Mon, Jul 7, 2025 at 5:37 PM Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
> On Mon, 2025-07-07 at 16:29 -0700, Eduard Zingerman wrote:
> > On Tue, 2025-07-08 at 00:30 +0200, Paul Chaignon wrote:
> >
> > [...]
> >
> > > This is really nice! I think we can extend it to detect some
> > > always-true branches as well, and thus handle the initial case reported
> > > by syzbot.
> > >
> > > - if a_min == 0: we don't deduce anything
> > > - bits that may be set in 'a' are: possible_a = or_range(a_min, a_max)
> > > - bits that are always set in 'b' are: always_b = b_value & ~b_mask
> > > - if possible_a & always_b == possible_a: only true branch is possible
> > > - otherwise, we can't deduce anything
> > >
> > > For BPF_X case, we probably want to also check the reverse with
> > > possible_b & always_a.
> >
> > So, this would extend existing predictions:
> > - [old] always_a & always_b -> infer always true
> > - [old] !(possible_a & possible_b) -> infer always false
> > - [new] if possible_a & always_b == possible_a -> infer true
> >         (but make sure 0 is not in possible_a)
> >
> > And it so happens, that it covers example at hand.
> > Note that or_range(1, (u64)-1) == (u64)-1, so maybe tnum would be
> > sufficient, w/o the need for or_range().
> >
> > The part of the verifier that narrows the range after prediction:
> >
> >   regs_refine_cond_op:
> >
> >          case BPF_JSET | BPF_X: /* reverse of BPF_JSET, see rev_opcode() */
> >                  if (!is_reg_const(reg: reg2, subreg32: is_jmp32))
> >                          swap(reg1, reg2);
> >                  if (!is_reg_const(reg: reg2, subreg32: is_jmp32))
> >                          break;
> >                  val = reg_const_value(reg: reg2, subreg32: is_jmp32);
> >                ...
> >                          reg1->var_off = tnum_and(a: reg1->var_off, b: tnum_const(value: ~val));
> >                ...
> >                  break;
> >
> > And after suggested change this part would be executed only if tnum
> > bounds can be changed by jset. So, this eliminates at-least a
> > sub-class of a problem.
>
> But I think the program below would still be problematic:
>
> SEC("socket")
> __success
> __retval(0)
> __naked void jset_bug1(void)
> {
>         asm volatile ("                                 \
>         call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];                    \
>         if r0 < 2 goto 1f;                              \
>         r0 |= 1;                                        \
>         if r0 & -2 goto 1f;                             \
> 1:      r0 = 0;                                         \
>         exit;                                           \
> "       :
>         : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
>         : __clobber_all);
> }
>
> The possible_r0 would be changed by `if r0 & -2`, so new rule will not hit.
> And the problem remains unsolved. I think we need to reset min/max
> bounds in regs_refine_cond_op for JSET:
> - in some cases range is more precise than tnum
> - in these cases range cannot be compressed to a tnum
> - predictions in jset are done for a tnum
> - to avoid issues when narrowing tnum after prediction, forget the
>   range.

You're digging too deep. llvm doesn't generate JSET insn,
so this is syzbot only issue. Let's address it with minimal changes.
Do not introduce fancy branch taken analysis.
I would be fine with reverting this particular verifier_bug() hunk.





[Index of Archives]     [Linux Samsung SoC]     [Linux Rockchip SoC]     [Linux Actions SoC]     [Linux for Synopsys ARC Processors]     [Linux NFS]     [Linux NILFS]     [Linux USB Devel]     [Video for Linux]     [Linux Audio Users]     [Yosemite News]     [Linux Kernel]     [Linux SCSI]


  Powered by Linux