[+keyrings]
On Sat, 2025-06-07 at 01:29 +0200, KP Singh wrote:
[...]
> diff --git a/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c b/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c
> index f010295350be..e1dbbca91e34 100644
> --- a/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c
> +++ b/tools/bpf/bpftool/prog.c
> @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
> #include <linux/err.h>
> #include <linux/perf_event.h>
> #include <linux/sizes.h>
> +#include <linux/keyctl.h>
>
> #include <bpf/bpf.h>
> #include <bpf/btf.h>
> @@ -1875,6 +1876,8 @@ static int try_loader(struct gen_loader_opts
> *gen)
> {
> struct bpf_load_and_run_opts opts = {};
> struct bpf_loader_ctx *ctx;
> + char sig_buf[MAX_SIG_SIZE];
> + __u8 prog_sha[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
> int ctx_sz = sizeof(*ctx) + 64 * max(sizeof(struct
> bpf_map_desc),
> sizeof(struct
> bpf_prog_desc));
> int log_buf_sz = (1u << 24) - 1;
> @@ -1898,6 +1901,24 @@ static int try_loader(struct gen_loader_opts
> *gen)
> opts.insns = gen->insns;
> opts.insns_sz = gen->insns_sz;
> fds_before = count_open_fds();
> +
> + if (sign_progs) {
> + opts.excl_prog_hash = prog_sha;
> + opts.excl_prog_hash_sz = sizeof(prog_sha);
> + opts.signature = sig_buf;
> + opts.signature_sz = MAX_SIG_SIZE;
> + opts.keyring_id = KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING;
> +
This looks wrong on a couple of levels. Firstly, if you want system
level integrity you can't search the session keyring because any
process can join (subject to keyring permissions) and the owner, who is
presumably the one inserting the bpf program, can add any key they
like.
The other problem with this scheme is that the keyring_id itself has no
checked integrity, which means that even if a script was marked as
system keyring only anyone can binary edit the user space program to
change it to their preferred keyring and it will still work. If you
want variable keyrings, they should surely be part of the validated
policy.
Regards,
James
